Oi Lei, bicameral ni sona. Fiji is far too small for such grandeur legislature, keep it simple Voreqe, it’s way to complicated, especially for a self appointed wannabe prime minister.
Bet your declining Fiji Dollar he, Voreqe doesn’t know what bicameral means or even how to spell it. Malo a maopo sivia Voreqe, you’re way out of your depth old oink.
Here it is FYI – what bicameral really means………………………………………………………………………
Perhaps the most conspicuous variation in modern legislatures concerns the
practice of granting legislative authority to two separate chambers with distinct
memberships. While the majority of national governments empower but a single
chamber, at least a third of national legislatures practice some form of bicameralism as do
49 of the 50 American state governments.1
Scholars have made a number of arguments to explain the emergence of
bicameral legislatures. One of the most common arguments for the emergence of
bicameralism in Britain and its American colonies is that it helped to preserve “mixed
governments,” to ensure that upper class elements of society were protected (Wood 1969,
Tsebelis and Money 1997). In such settings, bicameralism allowed the upper chamber,
dominated by aristocrats, to have a veto on policy. More generally, an explicit role of
some bicameral systems has been the protection of some minority who is overrepresented
in the upper chamber.
A second rationale for bicameralism is the preservation of federalism. The United
States, Germany, and other federal systems use a bicameral system in order to ensure the
representation of the interests of individual states and provinces, as well as the population
1 Tsebelis and Money (1997, 15) define bicameral legislatures as “those whose deliberations involve two
distinct assemblies.” This definition, however, masks considerable variation in the roles of each chamber
in policymaking. Many “upper” chambers have legislative prerogatives that are limited in important ways;
for instance, the British House of Lords is unable to originate monetary legislation and, at best, can delay
bills for a year rather than permanently veto those they disagree with. For our purposes, we wish to define
bicameralism more narrowly. We define bicameralism as the requirement of concurrent majority support
from distinct assemblies for new legislation. It is important to note that our definition treats concurrent
majorities as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for enacting legislation. Thus, it does not preclude
other legislative procedures or constitutional requirements, such as the signature of the executive or
supermajoritarianism within one of the chambers. Our definition does not map cleanly onto Lijphart’s
(1984) distinction between strong and weak bicameralism. His dichotomy classifies systems where both
chambers have similar constituent bases as weak even if they required concurrent majorities.
of the country. Under “federal bicameralism”, the lower house is typically apportioned
on the basis of population, while the upper house is divided amongst the regional units.
Some countries, such as the United States, provide equal representation for the states
regardless of their population or geographic size, while others, like the Federal Republic
of Germany, unequally apportion the upper chamber by providing additional
representation to the larger units.
However, despite its prominence, the role of bicameralism in contemporary
legislatures has not received the scholarly attention that other legislative institutions have.
In this essay, we review and analyze many of the arguments made on behalf of
bicameralism using the tools of modern legislative analysis — the spatial model,
multilateral bargaining theory, and games of incomplete information.2 Importantly, this
analytical approach allows us to distinguish the effects of bicameralism from those of the
institutional features which are often packaged with it, such as supermajoritarian
requirements, differing terms of office, and malapportionment